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R. v. K.R.J.: The Refined Approach  
to Punishment in Section 11  
of the Charter 
Stacey D. Young* 
Abstract 
In R. v. K.R.J.1 (“K.R.J.”) the Supreme Court acknowledged what is 
intuitive but was not explicit in section 11(i) Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms2 (“Charter”) jurisprudence: determining if something is 
punishment requires consideration of the impact it has on an offender. 
The critical question in K.R.J. was whether a section 161 Criminal Code3 
(“Code”) prohibition order constituted punishment within the meaning of 
section 11(i) of the Charter. Section 161(1) orders restrict the liberty 
interest of convicted sexual offenders who pose an ongoing risk of 
committing a sexual offence against a child. These orders restrict the 
ability of offenders to attend places where children are present, or have 
unsupervised contact with children, in person or through electronic 
means. The provisions are intended to protect children from abuse by 
repeat offenders. In K.R.J. the Supreme Court of Canada found the 
consequences of a sanction on the offender need to be considered in 
order to give a purposive interpretation to the Charter protection when 
determining whether a sanction amounts to punishment. In other words, 
it is not just the reason why a sanction is imposed that matters, its impact 
is also important. Both purpose and effect must be considered. This 
modified the previous test. In carving out “a clearer and more meaningful 
role for the consideration of the impact of a sanction” the court continued 
the trend towards greater acknowledgement of the consequences on an 
                                                                                                                       
* Deputy Director, Crown Law Office – Criminal, Ministry of the Attorney General. The 
views expressed are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the ministry. 
1  [2016] S.C.J. No. 31, 2016 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “K.R.J.”]. 
2  The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter the “Code”]. 
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offender. The reformulation of the test invites further litigation and has 
the potential to affect all manner of ancillary orders. For example, while 
orders for forfeiture or fine in lieu of forfeiture for proceeds of crime are 
not likely to be affected, forfeiture of offence-related property may now 
qualify as punishment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Part XXIII of the Code4 outlines the purposes and principles of 
sentencing, and the basis of punishment.5 The fundamental purpose of 
sentencing is to “protect society and to contribute ... to respect for the 
law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing 
just sanctions...” that have one of the enumerated objectives.6 The imposition 
of sanctions post-conviction is intended to protect the public and promote 
respect for the law by redressing the harm done to society by the offence. 
While the majority of available sanctions are set out in this Part of the 
Code, there has been a proliferation of ancillary orders that appear 
elsewhere in the Code that are imposed following a finding of guilt, and 
that may constitute “punishment”. This includes sections 109 and 110 
weapon prohibitions; section 161(1) prohibition orders for child sexual 
offenders; section 259 driving prohibitions; section 380.2(1) prohibition 
orders dealing with certain types of property; section 446(5) prohibition 
orders involving custody or control of an animal; DNA orders under 
sections 487.04 and 487.051; orders under the Sex Offender Information 
Registration Act pursuant to section 490.012; prohibition orders under 
Part XX.1 (mental disorder dispositions); forfeiture or fine in lieu of 
forfeiture for proceeds of crime (sections 462.37(1) or 462.37(3)) or 
forfeiture of offence-related property (section 490.1(1)). These orders 
impact an offender but if they do not constitute “punishment” they do not 
attract the protections set out in subsections 11(i) or (h) of the Charter.7  
                                                                                                                       
4  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended. 
5 Bill C-41, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and other Acts in 
consequence thereof, S.C., 1995, c. 22 came into effect in 1996.  
6 The objectives of sentencing include denunciation, deterrence, separation from society 
(when necessary), rehabilitation, providing reparations, and promoting responsibility. See subss. 
718(a-f). See also ss. 718.01, 718.1, 718.2 and related case law on the principles of sentencing. 
7 Section 12 is broader and protects against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. 
Provisions that do not constitute punishment may be captured under s. 12 as treatment, see R. v. 
Rodgers, infra, note 8, at para. 63. The Court of Appeal for Ontario recently declined to determine 
whether the test for punishment under s. 11(i) of the Charter also applies in the s. 12 context: R. v. 
Tinker, [2017] O.J. No. 3435, 2017 ONCA 552, at para. 125 (Ont. C.A.). 
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K.R.J. refined the test for determining what constitutes punishment in 
a Charter context. The explicit acknowledgement of the need to consider 
the effect of a sanction will serve as a check on the retrospective 
application of legislation and increase the protection of the rights of an 
accused. To appreciate the impact of the decision, it is first necessary to 
understand the constitutional context and development of the case law.  
II. SECTION 11 OF THE CHARTER: PUNISHMENT RELATED 
PROTECTIONS 
Section 11(i) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an 
offence has the right, “if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment 
for the offence has been varied between the time of commission and the 
time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment”. This section 
expresses society’s repudiation of retrospective punishment. This is an 
aspect of the Rule of Law.8 Citizens should know prior to committing an 
offence that the act is contrary to the law, and the possible punishment for 
breaking the law, so that knowledge guides their behaviour.9  
Section 11(h) provides that any person charged with an offence has 
the right, “if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again 
and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or 
punished for it again”. This is directed at preventing the State from 
making repeated attempts to convict an individual.10 This provision often 
involves consideration of criminal proceedings, and subsequent 
regulatory or quasi-criminal proceedings, and whether those proceedings 
amount to a trial for the same offence. 
Although these provisions are aimed at different rights, fairness in 
punishment informs both these provisions and supports a harmonious 
approach.11  
                                                                                                                       
8 Ben Juratowitch, Retroactivity and the Common Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 
2008), at 27-42. 
9 Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), at 77-101. 
10 R. v. Shubley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 1, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
11 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 39. 
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III. THE TEST FOR PUNISHMENT IN R. V. RODGERS12 
Prior to K.R.J., R. v. Rodgers was the governing authority for determining 
whether a discrete sanction or consequence of conviction amounted to 
“punishment” for the purpose of section 11(i) of the Charter. Rodgers dealt 
with DNA databank orders. The Code set out a process that permitted 
judicial authorization to seize DNA samples for the data bank. Taking 
samples was authorized for offenders who committed a designated offence 
after the DNA Identification Act came into force; those who committed an 
offence before the Act was proclaimed but were still before the Court; and, 
for three classes of offenders who were convicted and sentenced prior to the 
Act being proclaimed. Rodgers was a challenge to the latter. Section 487.055 
permitted a provincial court judge on an ex parte application to authorize 
the collection of DNA samples for dangerous offenders; offenders convicted 
of more than one murder; and persons convicted of “more than one  
sexual offence” and who, on the date of the application, were still serving  
a sentence of imprisonment of at least two years for one or more of those 
offences. Mr. Rodgers was a repeat sexual offender caught by this 
provision.13 
This case was ultimately considered by the Supreme Court and the 
Court dismissed constitutional challenges on the basis of sections 7, 8, 
11(h) and 11(i). In finding there was no violation of section 11(i) of the 
Charter, the Court examined what constituted punishment.  
Speaking for the majority, Charron J. explained that “punishment” 
refers to the arsenal of sanctions that may be imposed upon conviction 
and that the word “sentence” and “sanction” can be used interchangeably. 
However, for the purpose of section 11 of the Charter, punishment does 
not necessarily encompass every potential consequence of being convicted 
of an offence. A “consequence will constitute a punishment when it 
forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to which an accused may be liable 
in respect of a particular offence and the sanction is one imposed in 
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing”. The first branch 
of the test focuses on whether the sanction shares the characteristics  
of punitive sanctions common to the traditional forms of punishment 
provided for in the Code. The second branch of the test focuses on whether 
the sanction furthers the traditional purpose and principles of sentencing 
(i.e., the reason the sanction was imposed).  
                                                                                                                       
12 R. v. Rodgers, [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 2006 SCC 15 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodgers”]. 
13 Rodgers, id., at para. 2. 
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There was no mention of the effect of a sanction on an offender in the 
framework set out in Rodgers. In that context, it was unnecessary to 
develop the test further as the DNA sampling was not part of the “arsenal 
of sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular 
offence”. Nonetheless this omission was notable given the traditional 
consideration of both the purpose and effect in Charter analysis.  
IV. FORESHADOWING OF A NEW TEST: WHALING AND  
SECTION 11(H) 
The Supreme Court’s next substantive consideration of punishment in 
the context of section 11 of the Charter occurred in Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Whaling14 (“Whaling”). This case involved three challenges 
to the Abolition of Early Parole Act,15 the abolishment of accelerated 
parole review (“APR”) and whether that constituted double punishment 
contrary to the Charter. The Act eliminated accelerated parole review and 
applied retrospectively. The effect of this legislation was to change the 
parole eligibility dates from those in place at the time eligible offenders 
were sentenced. Where some offenders were formerly eligible after 
serving one-sixth of the sentence or six months, they were now only 
eligible for parole six months before the full parole eligibility date. The 
loss of APR was neither a second proceeding nor a “sanction” in the 
sense contemplated by Rodgers, and therefore the analytical framework 
set out in Rodgers could not be applied.  
To assess whether retrospective changes to the conditions of an 
original sanction constitute punishment, the court looked at: (1) whether 
the purpose of the law was to retrospectively prolong punishment, and 
(2) whether the effect of the law thwarted a settled expectation of liberty 
under the former law. In Whaling, abolishing the APR had the effect of 
extending an offender’s term of imprisonment, contrary to their “settled 
expectation” when they were sentenced.  
Articulated as thwarting “an offender’s settled expectation of liberty”, 
the practical impact of the Act was to extend an offender’s term of 
incarceration.16 Whaling signalled an acknowledgement by the Court that 
                                                                                                                       
14 Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, [2014] S.C.J. No. 20, 2014 SCC 20, at paras. 50-53 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whaling”]. 
15 S.C. 2011, c. 11. 
16 Consideration of the effect of a measure on an offender may also be seen outside the 
Charter context, for example as seen in the Court’s consideration of collateral consequences at 
sentence. In R. v. Pham, [2013] S.C.J. No. 100, 2013 SCC 15 (S.C.C.), the Court reduced the 
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determining what constitutes punishment requires consideration of the 
impact on the offender.  
V. THE NEW TEST FOR PUNISHMENT IN K.R.J. 
K.R.J. presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to refine the test 
set out in Rodgers. Given the decision in Whaling, it is not surprising that the 
court expanded the considerations for determining what is punishment, and 
harmonized the approach in sections 11(i) and (h) of the Charter.  
The accused in K.R.J. entered a guilty plea to charges of incest and 
making child pornography. Most of these offences were committed 
against his biological daughter between 2008 and 2011. The investigation 
originated with an anonymous informant providing a computer that 
allegedly belonged to the accused. When the RCMP arrested the accused 
they discovered electronic equipment, pornographic DVDs and journals. 
Thirteen disks of child pornography were found hidden in the ceiling  
of his kitchen. At the time of arrest the accused had sole custody of  
the children.17 K.R.J. was sentenced to six years for incest and three years 
consecutive for making child pornography (minus credit for pre-sentence 
custody). At sentencing the Crown sought a section 161(1) prohibition 
order.  
The scope of section 161(1) prohibition orders was enlarged in 2012 
by the Safe Streets and Communities Act.18 This Act came into force post 
offence in K.R.J., but pre-sentence. The Act was intended to be applied 
retrospectively. The new provisions provided: 
161. (1) When an offender is convicted, or is discharged on the 
conditions prescribed in a probation order under s. 730, of an offence 
referred to in subsection (1.1) in respect of a person who is under  
the age of 16 years, the court that sentences the offender or directs that 
                                                                                                                       
sentence of an offender from two years’ imprisonment for production of marijuana and possession 
for the purposes of trafficking to two years less a day. This avoided the loss of a right to appeal a 
removal order under the Immigration and Refuge Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 64. Although 
this was a collateral consequence arising outside of the sentencing context, a sentencing judge may 
take this impact into account when exercising his or her discretion in imposing an appropriate 
sentence, as long as “the sentence that is ultimately imposed is proportionate to the gravity of  
the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. See also R. v. Wong, [2016] B.C.J.  
No. 2215, 2016 BCCA 416 (B.C.C.A.); leave granted [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 557 (S.C.C.). 
17 Shortly after the accused and his wife separated, his wife moved to Ontario with the 
children, but within a week the children were removed from her care. The accused ultimately made 
an application for custody, becoming the sole caregiver for the victim and her brother.  
18 S.C. 2012, c. 1. 
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the accused be discharged, as the case may be, in addition to any other 
punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition 
prescribed in the order of discharge, shall consider making and may 
make, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, an 
order prohibiting the offender from 
(a) attending a public park or public swimming area where persons 
under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected 
to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or 
community centre; 
(a.1) being within two kilometres, or any other distance specified in the 
order, of any dwelling-house where the victim identified in the 
order ordinarily resides or of any other place specified in the order; 
(b) seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not 
the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer 
in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority 
towards persons under the age of 16 years; 
(c) having any contact — including communicating by any means — 
with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless the offender 
does so under the supervision of a person whom the court 
considers appropriate; or 
(d) using the Internet or other digital network, unless the offender does 
so in accordance with conditions set by the court.  
(emphasis added) 
Prior to the 2012 amendments, section 161(1)(c) only prohibited “using a 
computer system within the meaning of subsection 342.1(2) for the purpose 
of communicating with a person under the age of 16 years” and there was no 
general prohibition against using the Internet. In light of the change in the 
provision, the sentencing judge declined to impose a section 161(1) order 
under the new provisions, but imposed restrictions based on the version of 
section 161(1) that was in force at the time of the offence.  
The appellant appealed his sentence to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, and the Crown cross-appealed the finding that the amendments 
to section 161 did not apply retrospectively. The appellant/respondent on 
the cross-appeal argued that the retrospective application of the provision 
offended section 11(i) of the Charter. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
sentence (although it adjusted pre-custody credit), and also allowed the 
Crown appeal. The amendments to section 161(1) of the Code were 
intended to apply retrospectively. Further, the majority of the Court of 
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Appeal found that the subsections did not constitute ‘punishment’ and 
accordingly their retrospective application did not offend section 11(i) of 
the Charter.  
A different conclusion had been reached by the Court of Appeal for 
Nova Scotia.19 It is therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court 
granted leave to appeal in K.R.J. and stated two constitutional questions: 
Does the retrospective operation of subsections 161(1)(c) and (d) of the 
Code, as enacted by section 16 of the Safe Streets and Communities Act, 
infringe section 11(i) of the Charter? If so, is the infringement a 
reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society under section 1 of the Charter? 
A unanimous court found that the test under section 11(i) had to be 
clarified: yet the Court split on the application of the new test to the 
provisions. The framework in Rodgers did not provide sufficient 
guidance to determine what constitutes punishment. The purpose of 
enhancing public protection underlines all aspects of criminal law, while 
punishment has the effect of restricting an offender’s liberty. Both 
purpose and effect must be considered to determine what amounts to 
punishment. Accordingly, the Court added a third component to the 
Rodgers test:  
[41] … I would restate the test for punishment as follows in order to 
carve out a clearer and more meaningful role for the consideration of 
the impact of a sanction: a measure constitutes punishment if (1) it is a 
consequence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions to 
which an accused may be liable in respect of a particular offence, and 
either (2) it is imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of 
sentencing, or (3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or 
security interests. 
The requirement of a “significant impact” in the third prong of the test 
necessarily involves a qualitative assessment of the impact on an offender. 
This was in keeping with the comment of the Court in Rodgers that not 
every potential consequence of conviction will constitute punishment.20 
Some weighty interference with a liberty interest is required, otherwise even 
the most minor consequence would amount to punishment.21 This prong of 
the test requires a significant constraint on a person’s ability to engage in 
                                                                                                                       
19 R. v. Farler, [2013] N.S.J. No. 41, 2013 NSCA 13 (N.S.C.A.). 
20 Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 63. 
21 The Charter protects against state action that is significant: Cunningham v. Canada, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).  
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otherwise lawful conduct or impose significant burdens not imposed on 
other people.22 The Court cited with approval the approach of Doherty J. in 
R. v. Hooyer,23 in determining what constitutes a “significant impact”:24  
… [A] prohibition that significantly limits the lawful activities in which 
an accused can engage, where an accused can go, or with whom an 
accused can communicate or associate, would sufficiently impair the 
liberty and security of the accused to warrant characterizing the 
prohibition as punishment.25 
Both of the amendments in section 161(1)(c) and (d), could have a 
significant impact on the liberty and security of offenders. Living under 
restrictions in the community attracts stigma and the prohibitions have 
the potential to impact employment, as well as the ability to interact with 
people in both public and private spaces.  
The 2012 amendments to section 161(1) constitute punishment. They (1) 
were a consequence of conviction that formed part of the arsenal of 
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect of an offence, (2) 
were imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing, and 
(3) had a significant impact on an offender’s liberty and security interests.26 
                                                                                                                       
22 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
23 R. v. Hooyer, [2016] O.J. No. 280, 2016 ONCA 44 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hooyer”]. 
24 The appellant in Hooyer was convicted of one count of fraud contrary to s. 380 and 
one count of theft contrary to s. 331. An elderly man was in a long-care facility with dementia 
when his wife passed away. The appellant was like an adopted son and assumed power of 
attorney. Over the course of several years the appellant converted the bulk of the money he held 
in trust to his own use, neglecting the payment of the victim’s expenses and depleting the estate. 
He also diverted money for health expenses that was payable by Veterans Affairs to the nursing 
home to his own use. At sentencing, the trial judge made a s. 380.2(1) order prohibiting the 
appellant from ever seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment or becoming a volunteer 
in any capacity that would involve authority over the real property, money or valuable security 
of another person. On appeal Hooyer alleged a violation of s. 11(i) of the Charter but withdrew 
that argument when it became clear that proper notice had not been provided. Instead, counsel 
framed the issue as one of statutory interpretation. Counsel argued s. 380.2(1) came into force in 
November 2011 (S.C. 2011, c. 6, s. 4) several months after the fraud on Veterans Affairs. The  
s. 380.2(1) prohibition constituted punishment and under the prevailing rules of statutory 
interpretation should be applied prospectively only, absent a clear indication that Parliament 
intended it to be applied retrospectively. The Court agreed. The s. 380.2(1) order prohibited a 
“wide variety of otherwise lawful activities. These included many forms of employment. The 
prohibition could well significantly negatively affect the appellant’s ability to find and maintain 
employment and fully participate within his community”. This meaningfully restricted the 
liberty interest of the accused and amounted to punishment even though the purpose was to 
protect the public.  
25 Hooyer, id., at para. 42. 
26 It would have been sufficient to satisfy either of the latter two criteria, but both were 
satisfied in this case. 
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1. Retrospective Application of Punishment is Allowable: Section 1 
Analysis 
Having found that the provisions in subsections 161(1)(c) and (d) 
constituted punishment, the Court went on to consider whether the 
provision could nonetheless be saved as a reasonable limit that was 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 of 
the Charter.  
The objective of the infringing measure was “to better protect children 
from the risks posed by offenders like the appellant who committed their 
offences before, but were sentenced after, the amendments came into 
force”.27 There was no real debate that the legislative intent was pressing 
and substantial; the issue was whether the retrospective application 
satisfied the proportionality requirements.28 The Court split on whether the 
deleterious effects of the violation outweighed the objective.29  
According to the majority, the need for the retrospective application 
of the prohibitions in section 161(1)(d) was more compelling than for 
section 161(1)(c). Section 161(1)(d) was enacted to address an emerging 
threat and close a legislative gap.  
The rate of technological change over the past decade has fundamentally 
altered the social context in which sexual crimes can occur. Social 
media websites (like Facebook and Twitter), dating applications (like 
Tinder), and photo-sharing services (like Instagram and Snapchat) were 
all founded after 2002, the last time prior to the 2012 amendments that 
substantial revisions to s. 161(1) were made. These new online services 
have given young people — who are often early adopters of new 
technologies — unprecedented access to digital communities. At the 
same time, sexual offenders have been given unprecedented access to 
potential victims and avenues to facilitate sexual offending.30 
The previous provision was focused solely on using a computer system to 
communicate with a person under the age of 16. The new, broader provision 
expanded the means of communication so it covered all forms of technology 
                                                                                                                       
27 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 65. Conversely, Brown J. considered the amendments as a 
whole, as opposed to their retrospectively (para. 137). As Justice Brown was alone in his approach to 
this issue, it is unlikely that this will be adopted in other cases. 
28 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). 
29 Writing on behalf of seven members of the Court, Karakatsanis J. found s. 161(1)(d) was 
justified under s. 1, but s. 161(1)(c) was not. Justice Brown would have upheld the retrospective 
application of both subsections, and Abella J. would not have permitted either subsection to be 
applied retrospectively. 
30 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 102. 
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that were being used to access children including email, smartphones, the 
Internet and any other digital network.31 It also encompassed a broader range 
of behaviour that presented a risk to children.32  
This was a “compelling temporal reason”, and the need to respond to an 
emerging threat did not undermine the fairness of the legal system or offend 
the rule of law to the same degree, since Parliament was closing a 
legislative gap.33 The deleterious effects of the retrospective application of 
this subsection were attenuated by this rapidly changing social context.  
Conversely, there was no such temporal justification for the addition 
of a prohibition against having any contact, including communicating by 
any means, with a person who is under 16 years of age, as prohibited by 
section 161(1)(c). Previously an offender could be prohibited from 
attending specified places where children are present, such as a playground 
or daycare centre, or could reasonably be expected to be present, like a 
public park or swimming area. The prohibition was expanded by the 
addition of this subsection to include both public and private spaces, 
potentially including an offender’s own home if they have children or 
younger family members. There was no evidence to show the previous 
sentencing regime was insufficient and therefore no compelling basis to 
explain why the new provisions had to be applied retrospectively. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
In contrast to the original test established in Rodgers, the refined test 
from K.R.J. represents a less deferential approach to Parliament. It is not 
sufficient for the government to retrospectively impose a sanction in the 
name of public protection; it must do so in a manner that does not 
significantly impact an offender’s liberty or security interests. If it does, 
it will be considered punishment and retrospective application will 
violate section 11(i) of the Charter. 
                                                                                                                       
31 See comments of Ms. Carole Morency, Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights Evidence 40th parl., 3rd session, number 45, February 2, 2011, at p. 14; and number 50, 
February 28, 2011, at p. 4. 
32 This includes preventing: access to child pornography; access to like-minded peers who 
might encourage offending or normalize sexual interest in a child; and, access to children through a 
third party who might participate or facilitate sexual abuse of children (see for example, Safe Streets 
and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 23, which created s. 172.2 of the Code: the offence of using 
telecommunication to agree or arrange to commit a number of sexual offences against a child).  
33 K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 110. In contrast, Brown J. considered the temporal issue a 
factor to be considered when assessing the pressing and substantial nature of the objective, rather 
than the proportionality analysis.  
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Explicit acknowledgement of the effect of a sanction on an offender in 
the analysis of K.R.J. was both intuitive and predictable following Whaling. 
The types of sanctions that are imposed following conviction have 
expanded beyond the traditional penal consequences of imprisonment and 
fines of a certain magnitude.34 The purpose of these measures alone should 
not be determinative of whether they amount to punishment. This is 
consistent with the general approach to Charter analysis and will provide 
accused persons with increased protection against the retrospective 
application of measures that significantly constrain their liberty. While it 
was unknown exactly how the court would incorporate effect into the 
section 11(i) analysis, it was clear post-Whaling that the Court’s willingness 
to consider effect could have implications for numerous sanctions that have 
emerged over the last two decades. The expansion of ancillary orders, such 
as section 161(1) prohibition orders, made this issue ripe for section 11(i) 
constitutional consideration.35  
The decision in K.R.J. will undoubtedly usher in more litigation. If a 
sanction now amounts to punishment in the context of a section 11 
constitutional analysis because of the effect on an offender, some may try 
to argue that the sanction should be considered when assessing the 
totality and proportionality of the sentence, despite being imposed for a 
different purpose. However, this is contrary to developing case law. In 
the context of Charter challenges, new and existing ancillary orders will 
now be assessed using the K.R.J. framework. The requirement for a 
“significant” impact on an offender’s liberty and security interests 
provides fertile ground for litigation. It is likely that some orders will 
now qualify as ‘punishment’ that would not have satisfied the test in 
Rodgers, and those boundaries will no doubt be tested. For example, one 
area that has not traditionally been considered punishment is forfeiture or 
fine in lieu of forfeiture for proceeds of crime, and the analogous 
                                                                                                                       
34 R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] S.C.J. No. 71, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541 (S.C.C.). 
35 Hamish Stewart, in “Punitive in Effect: Reflections on Canada v. Whaling” (2015), 71 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 263 correctly noted that Whaling could have implications on a number of 
consequences of convictions, such as a victim fine surcharge under s. 737 of the Code, or 
registration requirements for sexual offenders. He suggested there is now a strong case to suggest the 
registration requirements under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (S.C. 2004, c. 10)  
s. 2(1) amount to punishment. This Act imposes an obligation to report annually or upon certain 
events. This includes providing: name, date of birth, address, employment details, education 
program details, telephone number, physical description, vehicle information, licence number, and 
passport number. However, it is unlikely that this will amount to punishment. The reporting 
requirement will likely not amount to a ‘significant burden’ as defined by K.R.J. It does not 
significantly limit the offender’s lawful activities, movement or communication; it only requires the 
offender to provide information about himself and his activities. K.R.J., supra, note 1, at para. 42. 
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forfeiture order for offence-related property. Under the K.R.J. analysis, 
forfeiture of offence related property may now qualify as punishment. It 
constrains lawful conduct by removing a person’s existing rights to use 
and dispose of their property. This can be distinguished from forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime which seeks to remove the benefit of an illegal activity 
and does not constrain lawful conduct.  
1. Forfeiture — Proceeds of Crime and Offence-Related Property 
Part XX.2 of the Code deals with proceeds of crime and authorizes its 
forfeiture or a fine in lieu of forfeiture in certain circumstances.36 While 
orders under this section are considered part of the sentence for the 
purposes of an appeal,37 the Court of Appeal for Ontario has said these 
orders do not constitute punishment.38 Although these cases did not arise 
in a constitutional context, the approach of the courts was consistent with 
the approach in Rodgers. 
                                                                                                                       
36 Section 462.37 provides in part: 
(1) Subject to this section and sections 462.39 to 462.41, where an offender is convicted, 
or discharged under section 730, of a designated offence and the court imposing sentence 
on the offender, on application of the Attorney General, is satisfied, on a balance of 
probabilities, that any property is proceeds of crime and that the designated offence was 
committed in relation to that property, the court shall order that the property be forfeited 
to Her Majesty to be disposed of as the Attorney General directs or otherwise dealt with 
in accordance with the law. 
… 
(3) If a court is satisfied that an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) or (2.01) should 
be made in respect of any property of an offender but that the property or any part of or 
interest in the property cannot be made subject to an order, the court may, instead of 
ordering the property or any part of or interest in the property to be forfeited, order the 
offender to pay a fine in an amount equal to the value of the property or the part of or 
interest in the property. In particular, a court may order the offender to pay a fine if the 
property or any part of or interest in the property 
(a) cannot, on the exercise of due diligence, be located; 
(b) has been transferred to a third party; 
(c) is located outside Canada; 
(d) has been substantially diminished in value or rendered worthless; or 
(e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without 
difficulty.  
(emphasis added) 
37 Section 673 of the Code. 
38 The possibility of incarceration that may result from non-payment of a fine in lieu of 
forfeiture pursuant to s. 743.7 of the Code does not change the nature of the order. Section 743.7 is 
an enforcement provision and is not punishment: R. v. Wu, [2003] S.C.J. No. 78, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 530 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Bourque, [2005] O.J. No. 591, at para. 20 (Ont. C.A.).  
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While the intention of the general sentencing provisions is to “punish an 
offender for committing a particular offence”, the purpose of forfeiture in 
Part XII.2 is to “deprive the offender and the criminal organization of the 
proceeds of their crime and to deter them from committing crimes in the 
future”.39 Such an order is part of the sentence, but it is nevertheless 
distinguished by the fact that its purpose is to remove the proceeds of crime. 
It is not punishment specifically for the designated offence, but in addition 
to the sentence imposed for the offence.40  
In R. v. Lavigne, Deschamps J. writing for the Court, considered whether 
the ability of an offender to pay is relevant when imposing a fine in lieu of 
forfeiture.41 The offender was part of a cannabis trafficking ring. He entered 
a guilty plea to conspiring to produce and traffic in cannabis, possess 
cannabis for the purposes of trafficking and possess property derived  
from trafficking in cannabis, and committing indictable offences for the 
benefit of a criminal organization (sections 465 and 467.12 of the Code 
respectively). In addition to a custodial period, the Crown sought an order 
for a fine in lieu of forfeiture pursuant to section 462.37(3). The trial judge 
determined that the offender had received at least $150,000 from his 
offences, but by the time of sentence he had disposed of the money. The 
trial judge imposed a sentence equivalent to 50 months’ imprisonment, and 
a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $20,000. This was less than the amount of the 
proceeds, but what the trial judge felt was appropriate in light of the 
inability of the offender to pay the full amount. Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court was called upon to consider whether the ability to pay is a proper 
consideration for a fine in lieu of forfeiture, as it would be for a fine 
imposed under section 734(2) of the Code.  
The Court found that ability to pay had no place in consideration of the 
quantum of the fine in lieu of forfeiture, but it was relevant to the amount of 
time the offender should be given to pay. This decision was based on the 
reason the order was imposed — removing the benefit of the crime.  
The amicus curiae argues that the effect of imposing a fine without 
regard to the general principles of sentencing is to punish the 
offender twice. What that argument fails to consider is that those 
principles are not all disregarded and that a fine instead of forfeiture 
is seen as a separate component of the sentence. While such an order  
 
                                                                                                                       
39 R. v. Lavigne, [2006] S.C.J. No. 10, 2006 SCC 10, at paras. 9, 16, 30 (S.C.C.). 
40 Lavigne, supra, note 43, at paras. 25, 33. 
41 The offender did not participate in the appeal and amicus curiae was appointed to  
assist the court. 
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is technically part of the sentence, it is nevertheless distinguished by 
the fact that its purpose is to replace the proceeds of crime. It is not 
regarded as punishment specifically for the designated offence.42 
Although Lavigne was released prior to Rodgers, it was heard while 
Rodgers was on reserve and reflects the focus on the purpose for 
imposing an order. A forfeiture order is imposed to remove the financial 
benefit to the offender or criminal organization. Although it has a 
deterrent effect, not all sanctions with a deterrent effect are punishment: 
the measure must be imposed in furtherance of the purpose and 
principles of sentencing. 
Another similar forfeiture order exists for offence-related property,43 
and there is mounting tension between purpose and effect for this 
sanction, albeit not in a Charter context.44 In R. v. Craig45 the offender 
entered a guilty plea to producing marijuana contrary to section 7(1) of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“CDSA”).46 This production 
occurred in the offender’s home and the Crown brought an application 
for forfeiture of offence-related real property — the offender’s home — 
under the CDSA. Justice Abella for the majority made it clear that the 
considerations at play for a forfeiture order were distinct from the 
principles of sentencing.47 While the majority acknowledged forfeiture 
orders for offence-related property may have a punitive impact on an 
offender48 that was not the purpose of the order. “The sentencing inquiry 
focuses on the individualized circumstances of the offender; the main 
focus of forfeiture orders, on the other hand, is on the property itself and 
its role in past and future crime”.49  
                                                                                                                       
42 Lavigne, supra, note 43, at paras. 10, 16, 25. 
43 Offence-related property includes any property that is used in connection with or 
intended to be used in connection with the commission of an indictable offence under the Code or a 
designated offence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. 
44 There is a distinction between establishing that something is punishment for the 
purposes of a s. 11 Charter analysis, and determining whether the sentencing principles set out 
in ss. 718.1 and 718.2 of the Code are engaged. For example, a court may impose an ancillary 
order but not factor the order into a totality assessment if the purpose of the order is not to 
punish the offender.  
45 [2009] S.C.J. No. 23, 2009 SCC 23 (S.C.C.). 
46 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
47 Craig, supra, note 49, at para. 13. Note that Justice Abella specifically commented that 
the appeal was not based on a constitutional challenge to the forfeiture provisions. 
48 Craig, id., at paras. 22 and 34. 
49 Craig, id., at para. 40. 
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In contrast, LeBel and Fish JJ. found that forfeiture of offence-related 
property may have a punitive effect on an offender and should be taken 
into account when considering the global sentence.50 Justice Fish focused 
on how the offender legally obtained the property but the assets were 
subsequently caught by the forfeiture provisions.51 In that context 
forfeiture would be “unmistakably punitive in effect”.52  
Since the release of K.R.J. the Supreme Court has not directly dealt with 
the issue of whether a proceeds of crime forfeiture order, or order for a fine 
in lieu of forfeiture, amount to punishment. Shortly after K.R.J. the Court  
of Appeal for Ontario commented that these orders do not constitute 
punishment, but again, these comments were not made in a Charter context, 
and the Court did not consider the impact on an offender. 
In R. v. Angelis53 the Crown appealed the failure of a trial judge to 
impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture. The offender was an account manager 
who committed a five-year fraud against Dayco Canada Corp, his 
employer. While on bail he committed three additional book-keeping and 
accounting frauds. The offender was sentenced to the equivalent of four 
years and three months imprisonment. Restitution orders were made for 
the frauds committed while on bail, but no restitution order was made in 
favour of Dayco, which had insurance coverage for the loss. The 
offender had dissipated his assets and the Crown sought a fine in lieu of 
forfeiture for the losses suffered.  
On appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the relevance of the 
general sentencing principles was again raised. The court looked to the 
purpose of the two Parts of the Code. Part XXIII focuses on punishment 
of the offender for the crime they committed. Part XII.2 is focused on the 
proceeds of crime acquired through the commission of the offence. The 
purpose of Part XII.2 is not punishment and the court of appeal noted this 
explicitly.54 Accordingly, the purpose and principles of sentencing do not 
                                                                                                                       
50 Craig, id., at paras. 89, 93.  
51 Craig, id., at para. 96. 
52 Craig, id., at paras. 93 and 100. 
53 [2016] O.J. No. 4735, 2016 ONCA 675 (Ont. C.A.); leave refused [2016] S.C.C.A.  
No. 484 (S.C.C.).  
54 Angelis, id., at paras. 39 and 50; and R. v. Khatchatourov, [2014] O.J. No. 2847, 2014 
ONCA 464, at para. 55 (Ont. C.A.). In Khatchatourov, two offenders were convicted of committing 
various mortgage financing frauds that preyed upon recent immigrants from Russia and Ukraine 
using the newcomers’ identities to fraudulently obtain mortgage financing. The offenders were both 
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and fines in lieu of forfeiture were made pursuant to s. 462.37 
of the Code. Restitution orders were also issued to CMHC. The offenders challenged the orders on a 
number of grounds, including the imposition of concurrent restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture 
orders.  
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generally apply to forfeiture orders.55 The trial judge erred in considering 
rehabilitation and the general principles of sentencing when determining 
whether to grant a fine in lieu of forfeiture. The Court of Appeal imposed 
a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $1,036,750.56 
The conclusion that a fine in lieu of forfeiture is not punishment  
is consistent with the test in Rodgers, but would it pass the refined test  
in K.R.J.?  
2. Forfeiture and Fines in Lieu for Proceeds of Crime is not 
Punishment 
As canvassed above, applying the first two components of the test in 
K.R.J. to determine if forfeiture orders qualify as punishment can be 
dealt with in short order. First, an order for forfeiture or a fine in lieu of 
forfeiture under section 462.37(1) or 462.37(3) is a consequence of 
conviction that forms part of the arsenal of sanctions for which an 
offender may be liable for an offence.57 Second, these orders are not 
imposed in furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing. 
These orders are imposed to remove the proceeds of crime from 
offenders and criminal organizations so they do not profit from their 
offences. While forfeiture of proceeds of crime has a deterrent effect, that 
is not the focus of these types of orders.58 However, following K.R.J. a 
court conducting a section 11 Charter analysis must now go further to 
determine whether, regardless of the purpose, the order has a significant 
impact on the offender’s liberty or security interests. 
These orders do not restrict where an accused can go, or restrict the 
accused’s movement in any way. Nor do they impact the ability of an 
accused to communicate or associate with anyone. However, an order for 
forfeiture or fine in lieu of forfeiture impacts the economic interests of an 
accused. Forfeiture interferes with the peaceful enjoyment of the specific 
property, and constrains the offender from disposing of the property.  
A fine in lieu of forfeiture is a slightly different matter. The accused’s 
                                                                                                                       
55 Angelis, id., at para. 56. 
56 See also R. v. Saikaley, [2017] O.J. No. 2377, 2017 ONCA 374, at para. 181 (Ont. C.A.) 
that recognizes that a forfeiture order should not be conflated with punishment for the offences 
committed and should not be considered when assessing the totality of a sentence. 
57 Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 63. Note that a court can also order forfeiture without a 
conviction pursuant to s. 462.37(2) but that provision is not part of this analysis. 
58 Rodgers, supra, note 16, at para. 64; Lavigne, supra, note 43, at para. 25, Craig, supra, 
note 44, at para. 40. 
114 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
economic interests are still engaged, but there are no limitations on how 
an accused can deal with specific property. Rather, the accused is under a 
general obligation to pay an amount equal to the value of the assets that 
would otherwise be forfeited, if the assets were available. Despite these 
constraints and interference with economic interests, neither forfeiture 
nor a fine in lieu of forfeiture under section 462.37(1) or 462.37(3) 
should be considered punishment.  
Proceeds of crime include property, and benefits or advantages 
obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of 
a designated offence. By definition, an offender is in possession of the 
assets as a result of criminal activity. The offender therefore has no pre-
existing right to the property. It is illegal to possess property obtained by 
crime or launder the proceeds of crime.59 Any limitation on the ability to 
use or dispose of the property therefore does not constrain otherwise 
lawful conduct or lawful activities. 
3. Forfeiture of Offence-Related Property may be Punishment 
The approach to offence-related property is not as straightforward. 
The comments of both Abella J. for the majority, and the minority 
judgments of LeBel and Fish JJ. in Craig, acknowledge that these types 
of orders impact an offender. Unlike proceeds of crime, it is not illegal to 
possess offence-related property.60 It is the use of the property in the 
commission of an offence that taints the property and permits forfeiture. 
When forfeiture of offence-related property is ordered, the Court is 
removing the ability of an offender to deal with their legally-obtained 
property. This can have a significant impact on an offender’s interest. It 
is also worth noting that an order of forfeiture for offence-related 
property engages a proportionality assessment under section 490.41(3). 
This permits the court to decline to impose a forfeiture order if the 
impact of the order would be disproportionate to “the nature and gravity 
of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence and the criminal record, if any, of the person charged with  
or convicted of the offence”.61 Thus, while an order for forfeiture of 
offence-related property is directed at the property, the provision itself 
                                                                                                                       
59 Sections 354(1) and 462.31 of the Code respectively. 
60 Where an item is illegal to possess — such as illicit drugs, credit card skimming devices 
or some weapons — those items may be otherwise forfeited. 
61 The tailored nature of the order and the built-in proportionality assessment is relevant in 
the context of a s. 1 assessment in a Charter challenge. 
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acknowledges that the order may have a significant impact on an 
offender. Under the K.R.J. framework, regardless of purpose, if a 
measure has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty or security 
interests it will be punishment under section 11(i). Accordingly, the 
forfeiture of legally obtained property, such as a home, should be 
considered punishment under the third prong of the refined test in K.R.J. 
in a Charter analysis.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in K.R.J. recognized that determining whether a 
sanction constitutes punishment under section 11(i) of the Charter 
requires consideration of the effect of a provision on an offender. This 
was a predictable result following Whaling, and brings harmony to the 
Court’s overall approach to punishment in section 11 of the Charter. This 
acknowledgement of the need to consider the effect of a legislative 
measure when assessing punishment in a Charter context will provide 
greater protection to accused persons and focus attention on the 
constraints the legislation seeks to impose on the liberty and security of 
an accused. This additional consideration expands what ancillary orders 
may amount to punishment. For example, in a Charter context forfeiture 
of offence-related property may now be considered punishment. This is 
but one example of many ancillary orders available under the Code that 
will need to be re-examined through the lens of K.R.J. if applied 
retrospectively. We can anticipate further litigation as courts are called 
upon to apply this test. 
 
